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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses various legal and regulatory issues for developing strong capital and 
securities markets in the transition economies.  Toward this end, the paper analyses the 
available literature, and emphasizes that: (i) the development of corporate governance 
should be gradual and must take into consideration the customary laws that impact on the 
ownership structures and related preferences for doing business in the emerging markets; 
and (ii) the foreign investment policies should be consistent with the development of 
corporate governance and vice versa. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many scholars have proposed reform agendas for developing securities markets in the 
economies in transition.  The most debated approach is to introduce U.S. laws to such 
economies to develop a U.S.-style securities market, and doing so would be essential to 
trigger economic growth.1  While some scholars strongly suggest convergence of the 
corporate governance regimes to the U.S. model is a good way forward, others argue 
against this notion, highlighting the peculiar institutional make-up of the U.S. securities 
market that cannot be exported merely by changing the laws on the books.2  The scholars 
arguing against convergence also highlight significant and distinct socio-economic and 
political features of each society that may not only resist the reforms by way of 
                                                 
The author is grateful to Professor Troy Paredes for providing specific guidance on the issues discussed in 
this paper.  The author also takes this opportunity to thank Professor John Coffee, Professor John Haley, 
Professor Stanley Paulson and Professor John Drobak for providing guidance in respect of issues related to 
the discussion herein.  The present work would not have been possible without the profound guidance of 
the noted scholars.  Of course, the omissions remain my own. 
 
1 Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate 
Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2004). (Quoting the works of Rafael La Porta et al.) 
2 To quote a few, see generally Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 Econ. 
of Transition 325 (2000); Bernard S. Black et al., Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to the 
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 546 (2001); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and 
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001); Cally Jordan, The 
Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983 (2005); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems 
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2004); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate 
Governance and the Theory of the Firm: the Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 213 (1999). 
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transplant, but may also persist.  A renowned scholar has noted an intermediate position.3 
This position “has predicted that formal institutional variations in corporate law and 
practice will remain, but will be overshadowed by an increasing degree of functional 
convergence.”4    
 
Among the scholars that argue for the significance of culture, some have further 
suggested that recognizing the national cultures is important before embarking reforming 
corporate governance.5  To explain the above with regard to the transition economies, a 
tussle between the modern reforms and the local culture may generally exist at the level 
of ownership structure and corporate transactions.  Such ownership structures and 
transactions emanate from the cultural practices; or more precisely the customary law.  
For instance, customary practices discourage separation of ownership and control and are 
commonly in practice in emerging economies such as Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.  
As for the culturally consistent corporate transactions, a large number of the population in 
various transition economies including Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and the Middle-Eastern economies demands conducting corporate transactions and 
businesses in accordance with the principles of Islamic finance.  Accordingly, cultural 
factors including customary law are relevant for developing capital markets in the 
emerging economies due to their significant impact on ownership structure of the firms 
and the people’s preference for doing business.  However, a distinction between culture 
and customary law is not available in the comparative corporate governance literature, 
although such distinction exists in jurisprudence.6 
 
As a note of clarification, culturally-neutral modern regulatory reforms that seek to 
upgrade the capital and securities markets and do not clash with the local cultures and 
customary law are not the focus of discussion herein.  Although such reform will have a 
                                                 
3 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 329 (2001). 
4 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999) (discussing formal and functional 
convergence in foot note 27). 
5 Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 203 (2001). 
6 See generally THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 2001). 
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better success rate in the emerging markets, the developing countries should be careful in 
learning from the experiences of more advanced countries and importing regulatory 
structures because of the variation in the underlying differences of such structures.7 
 
With the exception of some countries, the securities markets in most of the transition 
economies do not significantly contribute to the economic growth at the macro-level, 
despite various reform initiatives, including those sponsored by international 
development organizations.  Despite this, in an effort to connect the economic reforms 
with economic growth, the transition economies are constantly working to modernize the 
legal structure to increase efficiency of the capital markets and facilitate foreign 
investment.  The emerging economies are also implementing various strategies to attract 
foreign investment in their securities markets, and often start with adopting the codes of 
corporate governance from the developed markets.  However, the success of such reforms 
is likely to be hindered by ignoring indigenous legal frameworks including the customary 
law.  Taking such indigenous sources of law into consideration could help create strong 
and deep securities markets in transition economies, and thus contribute to economic 
growth.  Furthermore, robust investment policies have not been able to turn the emerging 
securities markets to a success.  This paper will highlight some of the possible causes that 
could explain lack of foreign investment in the emerging securities markets. 
 
As noted, the “reforms may be more difficult, as their success would depend on the more 
general structure and efficiency of legal systems in different countries.”8  The success of 
such reforms for developing countries depends on specific analysis of customary laws 
and examination of foreign investment policies of such economies, before reforming and 
implementing a new corporate governance regime that is intended to boost economic 
growth.  The institutional make-up of the transition economies, specifically the 
customary law, provides better insight to the existing corporate governance regime.  
Overlooking such institutions in the reforms process will cast serious doubt on the 
                                                 
7 Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and 
Potential Implications 12-14 (Har. Law Sch. Program on Corp. Governance, Discussion Paper No. 521of 
2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Jackson_521.pdf. 
8 Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11883), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11883. 
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efficacy of the corporate governance reforms in the emerging markets.  This paper argues 
against replacing customary practices with the modern unfamiliar reforms.  In the event 
that any customary practice results in market abuse or otherwise hinders market growth, 
as discussed below, such practices should be gradually replaced with equally efficacious 
alternates. 
 
While indicating various policies and initiatives of the emerging markets, this paper will 
refer to Pakistan9 for explaining the jurisdiction-specific instances that Pakistan has in 
common with other emerging markets.  
  
The discussion in this paper is organized to present issues in relation to development of 
the capital markets, convergence of corporate governance and perspectives from the 
international securities markets.  Accordingly, Part I outlines features of strong capital 
markets, focusing primarily on the equity markets.  Part II analyzes issues in respect of 
convergence of corporate governance.  Part III leads the discussion to the developing 
securities markets in the transition economies and analyzes their possible international 
competitiveness.  This part also discusses issues such as regulatory convergence and 
foreign investment policies.  The paper concludes with observations highlighting 
prospects of future reforms and the distinct jurisdictional character of the emerging 
markets that is essential to understand before embarking upon reform initiatives for the 
capital and securities markets in such economies. 
 
                                                 
9 Among others, Pakistan is also classified as an emerging market, in terms of the criteria of per capita 
income and governmental restrictions and involvements with listed companies and foreign investors.  See 
Standard and Poor’s & International Finance Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Fact Factbook 2000, 2 
(2000). 
Supervised Research: Ibrahim, Ali Adnan 
 
 7 
 
I. DEVELOPING CAPITAL MARKETS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
A. Fostering Capital Markets 
 
Capital markets facilitate securities’ transactions in debt and equity and thereby supply 
financial resources in the financial markets.  With increased activity of transactions, 
access to cash becomes easier and the capital markets become efficient, creating enough 
liquidity in the market that spreads the economic and financial benefits to the market 
participants.  More the number of the participants deeper get the capital markets, and, 
therefore, deeper markets generate a larger financial activity.  Deep capital markets 
improve economic growth at micro and macro level.10  Or, put differently, there is simply 
a larger pool of available capital that enterprises can tap into to finance their activities. 
 
Owing to divergence of issues in the debt and equity markets, the discussion below refers 
only to the equity markets. 
 
Law Matters 
 
Recent empirical studies have shown that developing capital markets is a result of 
appropriate legal framework, or that “law matters.”  The “law matters thesis,”11 mainly 
emphasizes strong protections for the minority shareholders.  Recent reiteration12 of the 
law matters thesis, with “new emphasis on self-dealing,”13 recommends that effective 
regulation of “large self-dealing transactions,”14 their “full disclosure”15 and “giving 
                                                 
10 See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, J. POL. ECO. 1113, 1152 (1998).   
11 This expression was employed to describe the earlier works in the series of works by Simeon Djankov et 
al. and Rafael La Porta et al.  See generally Paredes, supra note 1 (discussing “law matters thesis”); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listing and Stock Market Competition on 
International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (discussing “law matters”). 
12 Djankov et al., supra note 8.  
13 Id. at 1. 
14 Id. at 37. 
15 Id. 
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aggrieved shareholders standing to sue, access to information…and a low burden of 
proof”16 is required for the development of securities markets.  Likewise, another study 
concluded that “securities laws matter”17 for prosperity of the financial markets.18 
 
Since the capital markets contribute to the economic growth and development, poor 
investor protection results in smaller capital markets.  Accordingly, good legal 
protections for investors and economic development are interlinked.19 
 
Although development can be accomplished via government ownership of banks, such 
governmental control does not result in rapid economic growth.20  Government 
ownership of Banks is associated with slower financial and economic development.21  
Poorly protected property rights and underdeveloped financial system give rise to 
government ownership of banks.22  In sum, government ownership of banks does not 
create an efficient financial development.23  However, the role of banks, in general, and 
the role of nationalized bank in the transition economies appears relevant to various 
initiatives that may not otherwise have been taken to accelerate economic growth.  To 
quote an instance, in Pakistan, the provision of agricultural loans and write-off policy in 
case of crop failure continue to benefit small farming industry. 
 
Recent studies bring evidence in an effort to answer why the United States and the United 
Kingdom have larger equity markets then Germany in France, and found that protections 
by way of legal rules and their enforcement have strong effects on the size and breadth of 
                                                 
16 Id.  (The earlier studies of in the series of The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing were criticized for 
ignoring “private action.”).  See generally John C. Coffee, supra note 4, at 1829. 
17 Rafael La Porta, et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN 1 (2006). 
18 Id. 
19 Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, J. POL. ECO. 1113, 1152 (1998).  (Although there were 
inconsistencies found in data gathering and coding techniques, the study remains a pioneering work.  See 
generally Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-Director 
Rights Index’ under Consistent Coding, (Har. Law Sch. Program on Corp. Governance, Discussion Paper 
No. 7 of 2006), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Spamann_7.pdf). 
20 Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN 265, 284 (2002). 
21 Id. at 290. 
22 Id. at 266. (Also arguing that the governments, through banks, provide subsidies and employments but 
also use the banks to reciprocate the political favors). 
23 Id. at 284. 
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capital markets.24  Good legal protection of potential financiers against possible 
expropriation by entrepreneurs ensures more funds, and hence expands the size of capital 
markets.25 
 
Today, financial globalization enables international investors to share the risk better and 
allows the capital to flow toward the most productive markets, and provides respective 
countries to reap the benefits of their comparative advantages.26  This, however, requires 
a structure of corporate governance that not only recognizes property rights but also 
provides effective enforcement to safeguard them.  As discussed below, such safeguards 
emanate primarily from the laws, enforcement mechanisms, and non-legal measures 
“such as market pressures, contracts, and norms of good practice that directors and 
officers follow.”27  Among such rights are improved legal protections for shareholders.  
However, presence of such protections is not the only solution for developing external 
finance in transition economies.28  A scholar has argued against the findings in an earlier 
study29 to note that “effective law enforcement is not a substitute for poor laws on the 
books” and concluded that “good laws cannot substitute for weak [legal] institutions” in 
the transition economies.30  In this context, it is pertinent to note that effective 
enforcement is always crucial with or without good laws on the books, with the 
difference that good laws with effective enforcement will achieve far greater results in 
developing capital markets.  
 
The variables that are relevant to explain U.S. and European capital structures have been 
found relevant in the similar analysis for the developing countries.31  However, 
development of financial and securities markets in the transition economies requires more 
specific studies that could, inter alia, examine the cultural practices and social norms to 
                                                 
24 Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants pf External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1132 and 1149 (1997). 
25 Id. at 1149. 
26 Rene M. Stulz, The Limits of Financial Globalization, 60 J. FIN. 1595, 1595 (2005). 
27 Paredes, supra note 1, at 1074.  
28 Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. OF TRANSITION 325, 356 
(2000).  
29 La Porta et al., supra note 19, at 1152. 
30 Pistor et al., supra note 28, at 356. 
31 Laurence Booth et al., Capital Structures in Developing Countries, 56 J. FIN. 87 (2001). 
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identify the “general structure and efficiency of legal systems” in such economies, and 
thereby inform the reform process for appropriate corporate law and governance.  While 
categorizing corporate governance initiatives to economic and legal institutions, an 
argument suggests that a political process may change such institutions for the better.32 
 
In sum, capital markets, including those in the emerging economies, cannot flourish 
without an appropriate legal framework that reduces subjective decision making and 
encourages transparent and objective enforcement of laws and the related regulatory 
framework.  Certainty as to the working and fairness of the systems will attract more 
participation in financial market, and will curb interest groups that benefit from its 
weakness.  Law should also build upon the social and cultural factors that enjoy similar 
force or obedience, such as customary laws. 
 
Agency Problems: Self-Dealing and Investor Protection 
 
In general, the foundations of the market systems include compelling transparency, 
prohibiting insider-dealing and policing self-dealing.33  “Corporate governance deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment”34 and it also “deals with the agency problem: separation of 
management and finance.”35  Investor protections and market development go hand in 
hand in the real world, and if “protections are absent, one-sided deals flourish and outside 
equity capital either becomes more expensive or dries up altogether.”36 
 
                                                 
32 Adnrei Shleifer et al., A Survey of Corporate Governance, J. FIN. 737, 738 (1997).  For further treatment 
of the argument see also Rene M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness and Finance, 70 J. FIN. 
ECON. 313, 346 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, at 1253, 1265, 1268; Amir N. Licht, et al., Culture, Law and Corporate Governance, 
25 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 229; and Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy of Controlling Minority Structure: A 
Kaleidoscope of Corporate Governance Reforms in Korean Chaebol, 34 LAW & POLICY INT’L BUS. 183, 
187. 
33 William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the 
Firm: the Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213, 296-97 (1999). 
34 Shleifer et al., supra note 32, at 737. 
35 Id. at 773. 
36 Bratton & McCahery, supra note 33, at 297. 
Supervised Research: Ibrahim, Ali Adnan 
 
 11 
To counter the agency problem, one of the arguments is that small investors cannot be 
attracted to the business of financing companies without legal protections against 
expropriation by managers and large investors.37  Greater protections for shareholders 
strongly predict the stock market development.38  Effective regulation of self-dealing is 
the fundamental element of shareholder protection39 that also results in dispersion of 
ownership.40 
 
The corporate model of “separation of ownership and control”41 is popular in the richest 
common law countries. Outside the United States, especially in countries with poor 
investor protection, the largest firms tend to have controlling shareholders.42 There may 
be greater reliance on debt financing rather than equity financing in such countries.43  
Ownership concentration is a consequence of poor legal protection of minority 
shareholders.44  However, in concentration of ownership, the protections for investors 
may be complementary to corporate governance.45  On a related issue of redistribution of 
wealth in the economy, the large investors could be ineffective, even though they may 
effectively control the agency problem.46 
 
Qualitative minority protection is equally significant for successful dividend policies.  
Shareholders, in countries with better protections, are willing to wait for the dividends for 
better investment opportunities in future and receive higher dividends.  Shareholders with 
poor protections apparently take whatever they can get and do not wait, fearing 
expropriation.47  More protections limit expropriation and result in higher dividends.48 
 
                                                 
37 Shleifer et al., supra note 32, at 769. 
38 Djankov et al., supra note 8, at 34. 
39 Id. at 35. 
40 Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 496 (1999). 
41 See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1932). 
42 La Porta et al., supra note 40, at 511. 
43 Id. at 508. 
44 Id. at 511. 
45 Shleifer et al., supra note 32, at 773. 
46 Id. at 774. 
47 Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1, 27 (2000). 
48 Id.  
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In countries with poor protections, the larger firms have ultimate owners, such as family, 
State or financial institutions.49  Globally, forty-five percent of the medium-sized firms 
are family-owned.  Bank-based ownership structure, like in Germany, is not the most 
common one; it is the family ownership.50  But, in countries with poor investor 
protection, widely held firms are otherwise exceptions.51  However, the family control is 
likely to facilitate corruption, and is more important in the most corrupt countries.52 
 
By limiting expropriation, the law raises the securities’ price in the market, and thus 
encourages more entrepreneurs to seek external finance.  This expands the financial 
markets.53  In countries of poor investor protections, poor shareholder protections result 
in lower valuations, but the higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholders 
improves valuation.54 
 
On-going disclosure of self-dealing transactions benefits the stock market development.55  
Aggrieved shareholders having standing to sue, access to information regarding self-
dealing and a low burden of proof is likely to deter the self-dealing, and would promote 
stock market development.56  The best strategy for avoiding self-dealing appears to be the 
reliance on “extensive disclosure, approval by disinterested shareholders and private 
enforcement.”57 
 
Quality of information regarding the value of company’s business and confidence against 
self-dealing are the preconditions for strong public securities markets.58  Honest courts 
and government, regulators and prosecutors are important, and should be homegrown 
                                                 
49 Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 497 (1999). 
50 Id. at 496. 
51 Id. at 498. 
52 Id. at 510. 
53 Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,  57 J. FIN. 1147, 1147 (2002). 
54 Id. at 1168. 
55 Djankov et al., supra note 8, at 37. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 38. 
58 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 781, 783 (2001). 
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before the market development.59  Suggestions for long-term steps include strengthening 
business and law schools, training young people and developing reputation 
intermediaries.60  The reputation intermediaries, however, are not likely to grow in 
anticipation of market growth; but their increasing demand will facilitate their growth in 
the emerging markets.  
 
The studies have examined anti-self-dealing measure for their relationship to financial 
markets development61 and found that a high anti-self-dealing index was associated with 
valuable stock markets.62 
 
While laws against self-dealing—and their effective enforcement—are crucial for the 
emerging markets, the economies in transition face the additional challenge of “twin 
agency problems” in international investments and financial globalizations.  That is to 
say, one of the corporate insider’s discretion and, the second, of the political or state-
ruler’s discretion.  The central role of the twin agency problem appears to remain 
unaffected for fostering ownership concentration.63  “[I]nvestment in corporate 
governance is less profitable in countries in which the agency problem of state ruler 
discretion is significant because many activities that entrench corporate insiders help 
reduce the risk of expropriation by the state.” 64 
 
Fighting agency problem is equally crucial for the emerging markets.  Effective 
transparency and accountability will ensure flow of the corporate profits to the investors.  
Expectancy of profit and security of investment will encourage a larger number of 
investors to move their bank deposits to the capital markets, a trend that is direly needed 
in the transition economies. 
 
                                                 
59 Id. at 848. 
60 Id. 
61 Djankov et al., supra note 8, at 2. 
62 Id. at 27. 
63 Stulz, supra note 26, at 1633. 
64 Id. at 1634. 
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Effective Enforcement 
 
It has been argued that effective law enforcement by the legal institutions is more 
important for enterprise finance in the transition economies than the laws on the books.65  
This argument will be accurate upon assumption that there is no room or possibility for 
improving the laws on the books, and effective enforcement is the only option for 
ensuring best results in the given scenario.  However, this assumption simply does not 
exist in the transition economies.  Almost competing with each other, the emerging 
markets are taking serious measures to improve the legal framework mainly for attracting 
foreign investment.  In these circumstances, the economies of transition must be 
reminded that effective enforcement will always be equally important.  Put differently, 
modern legal reforms should go hand in hand with the improvements in the enforcement 
mechanisms.   
 
Scholars have considered public involvement to be crucial for the development of 
financial markets and, therefore, the public sector has a key role to play: designing the 
rules that may be enforced.66  Arguing further, it was noted that securities law matter, as 
it facilitate private contracting67 and that financial markets may not prosper if left to 
market forces alone.68  Without taking the above arguments in the proposed generality, 
the above arguments appear more relevant for the economies in transition that are yet to 
ensure either basic legal protections or, if such protections exist, their effective 
enforcement.  In the absence of substantive rights and their effective enforcement, the 
emerging capital markets are not likely to mark their success.  Features like market 
discipline, private litigation, private contracting, standardized disclosure and private 
dispute resolution within market-friendly standards of liability have been considered 
relevant for stock market development.69  In the emerging markets, the above features 
would be relevant if introduced gradually and in  a culturally neutral manner.     
 
                                                 
65 Pistor et al., supra note 28, at 328. 
66 Djankov et al., supra note 8, at 37. 
67 La Porta, et al., supra note 17, at 28. 
68 Id. at 27. 
69 Id. at 28. 
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In general, public enforcement does not predict more developed stock markets.70  It also 
does not predict development of securities markets in transition economies71 and cannot 
provide an economic jump start to securities markets in poor countries.72  In successful 
stock markets, the shareholders receive the pertinent information that they may use for 
voting or for private action.73  
 
In contrast to having an elaborate legal system outlining the governance mechanism, 
administrative governance, by way of a quota-based administrative selection of firms 
from the administrative geographical regions to be eligible to go public, has provided a 
jump-start to China’s stock market.  However, administrative governance has its 
limitation, and has not been considered a replacement for a standard legal regime.74 
Accordingly, such a mechanism will not be workable for the transition economies 
because this will reduce the focus of developing legal institutions in such economies.  
The involvement of administrative discretion is most likely to further destabilize the 
developing legal structure. 
 
As recently confirmed, expensive implementation through a focused regulator,75 
democratic and political rights,76 criminal sanctions,77 and fines78 do not matter for 
developing stock markets.  However, the above would matter for the developing 
countries, although the studies do not specifically address the issues of emerging markets 
in this respect.  Developing capital markets are usually dominated by interest groups that 
stall the reforms that seek to circumvent their vested interests.  Such groups promote 
insider dealings and related market abuses to the detriment of the other market 
participants.  Proper enforcement, through legal institutions and effective regulator, 
                                                 
70 Djankov et al., supra note 8, at 27. (Arguing also, regarding the enforcement of laws, that the richer 
countries have better results see generally La Porta et al., supra note 24 at 1132. 
71 La Porta, et al., supra note 17, at 25. 
72 Id. at 25. 
73 Djankov et al., supra note 8, at 37. 
74 Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from 
China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184, 207 (2005).  
75 La Porta, et al., supra note 17, at 27. 
76 Id. at 25. 
77 Id. at 28. 
78 Djankov et al., supra note 8, at 37-38. 
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criminal sanctions and fines, will safeguard against expropriation, and will help prevent 
destabilization caused by the market abuses.  As for relevance of democratic and political 
rights, they will allow common understanding of corporate democracy and empower 
minority shareholders to assert their rights.  As such, in the absence of the developed 
market legal and non-legal institutions, the role of the regulator, criminal sanctions and 
fines become more significant to help avoid market malpractices, and across the board 
enforcement is likely to encourage the market growth.   
 
Effective and transparent accountability at the macro-level strengthens people’s 
confidence on their rights, and discourages those who would benefit from the weaknesses 
of the system.  Developing capital markets cannot grow if norms like the rule of law are 
missing in society.  A general tendency to disregard the rule of law, which, unfortunately, 
is widespread in most of the transition economies, shapes a culture of lawlessness that not 
only adversely impacts the growth of the capital markets but also the overall economic 
growth.  The culture of lawlessness breeds expropriation in the developing capital 
markets.  Therefore, for the transition economies, the legal culture of effective 
implementation and enforcement should receive greater attention, because no legal or 
regulatory measures would be fruitful in its absence.79   
 
B. Formation of Trust 
 
Illiteracy is rampant in most of the transition economies, and the appreciation for the 
human interaction and collective engagement in civic activities is accordingly lacking.  
Indeed, most of such population cannot read and write, and live in a dreadful poverty.  
Mobilizing them toward positive civic and infrastructural engagement would entail 
allocation of substantial financial resources that first of all help them meet their needs.  
Painfully, most of the transition economies lack such financial resources.  Therefore, 
society’s ability to foster social capital remains seriously impaired.  For the same reasons, 
impairment is far greater for expanding network of social capital to foreigners.   
                                                 
79 Benny S. Tabalujan, Why Indonesian Corporate Governance Failed - Conjectures Concerning Legal 
Culture, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 141, 169-171 (2002). 
Supervised Research: Ibrahim, Ali Adnan 
 
 17 
 
Social welfare initiatives by the affluent part of the society, for instance, in Pakistan has 
sought to bridge the absence of social capital.  Similar international initiatives have 
generated goodwill for the foreigners.  Increasing steps for better cultural representation 
and sponsoring public welfare projects by foreign firms and foreign governments are 
successfully nurturing the social capital.  Continued similar initiatives will significantly 
reduce any unfriendliness or hostility in the transition economies.80 
 
Lack of trust in a society may result in judicial system that cannot guarantee reliable 
enforcement.81  As defined, “trust is a habit formed during a centuries-long history of 
horizontal networks of association between people, covering both commercial and civic 
activities.”82  Building upon an existing argument that “trust or social capital determines 
the performance of the society’s institution,”83 some scholars have explored “the forces 
that encourage the formation of trust” and endorsed the argument.  The scholars noted 
that “trust should be more essential for ensuring cooperation between strangers…than for 
supporting cooperation among people who interact frequently.”84 
 
Regarding foreign investment in the transition economies, one of the main questions 
appears to be whether foreign investors would trust the local investors for participation in 
their ventures, and vice versa.  Formation of trust, therefore, appears essential in the 
transition economies. However, it has been argued that securities laws may serve as 
proxy for trust.85  But such laws can only serve the purpose if the capital markets are 
already popular and flourishing.  In order to create such a level of growth, developing and 
strengthening trust within the society appears essential for the transition economies.  
 
                                                 
80 For instance, establishing missionary hospitals, schools and similar philanthropic initiatives helped the 
imperial governments in generating positive sentiments within the colonized India.  Today, such initiatives 
from various developed countries continue to achieve such results in Pakistan.  To provide a recent 
example, the Pakistan subsidiary of the British American Tobacco has launched eye hospitals and 
contribute to the cancer hospitals.  
81 Pistor et al., supra note 28 at 328. 
82 Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, AMER. ECO. REV., 333, 336 (1997). 
83 Id. at 333. 
84 Id. 
85 La Porta, et al., supra note 17 at 25. 
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An analysis is important as to how a particular society regards people from different 
social origins.  One social force that encourages—or discourages—social interaction 
stems from religion.  Empirical confirmations are available that “hierarchical religion 
discourages horizontal ties between [the people] and hence the formation of trust.”86  The 
findings suggest that adherence to hierarchical religion, including Christianity, are likely 
to lack formation of trust within the society.  However, other studies have found better 
enforcement and protection of creditors’ right in Protestant countries.  The reasons 
explained in this regard include that centralization arises out of people’s dependence on a 
religious group for seeking knowledge, and hence does not encourage people to seek 
knowledge independently.  Specific studies in regard to the transition economies 
analyzing effects of religion on the capital markets in such economies are not available.  
Future studies highlighting such issues will assist the emerging economies devising 
future strategies for the growth and development of the capital and securities markets. 
 
Because a majority of the transition economies share a history of colonization, the 
transition economies may not be able to ensure formation of trust with the foreign 
investors because of the historical sentiments of dislike toward the foreigners, and such 
sentiments may still exist at the micro-level.  The scholars, while discussing issues 
regarding formation of trust, have not discussed this possible aspect of inquiry.  The 
scholars have also erred in their finding about the Muslim emerging markets.87  
Therefore, a comprehensive work examining the development of trust that is essential for 
the growth of capital markets is needed. 
 
As for developing trust between the locals and foreign investors in the transition 
economies, such formation of trust is likely to occur more easily after the capital markets 
have started to be profitable to the locals.  Profit motives will make it easier for the locals 
                                                 
86 La Porta et al., supra note 82, at 333. (Quotation marks omitted). 
87 La Porta et al., supra note 82, at 336. (The authors have noted that Muslim countries have “hierarchical 
religion.”  Islam does not encourage hierarchical division amongst the people rather it mandates horizontal 
proximity.  The Muslim countries’ inability to turn their social capital or trust into the industrial success 
does not appear to be on account of any (hierarchical or otherwise) religious adherence, but it may have 
other reasons, such as absence and non-development of corporate vehicle in the Islamic societies in the 
previous centuries.  See generally Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins 
and Persistence, (Working Paper No. 585687), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=585687). 
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to more openly welcome the foreign investors in the capital markets.  Policies of 
attracting foreign investment in the transition economy lack understanding of this aspect 
and rely more on developing the market through the foreign investment.  Such approach 
is less likely to work.  The locals without having the opportunity to maximize their 
wealth in their own capital markets are likely to resent the foreign investors, and may 
classify them at par with the colonial looters.  Such sentiments would work against the 
developing strong capital markets in the emerging economies. 
 
C. Cultures and Customs88 
 
While understanding corporate governance across countries, culture—including 
religion—must be kept in view.  In other words, culture matters.89  Some scholars have 
found correlation between culture and development of debt and banking markets.90  Other 
scholars have highlighted its relevance for developing capital markets.91 
 
Norm and Law 
 
A notable scholar has suggested a significance and prevalence of norms in circumstances 
where the law remains weak or fails to provide reasonable protection.  Noting a converse 
suggestion, it was added that the importance of norms is likely to fade away when law 
provides adequate remedial recourse.92  However, it remains to be seen whether the 
established social norms in the developing economies are likely to persist; 
notwithstanding the introduction of new rules that remain unfamiliar, unless the new 
rules draw upon the existing norms.93  Indigenous culture can reassert itself forcefully in 
                                                 
88 See also infra Part III below. 
89 Stulz & Williamson, supra note 32, at 346.  (However, the authors have not treated Islamic law to be 
relevant legal system for investor protection even for the Muslim countries where Islamic law has been 
practiced for centuries.)  See also Roe, supra note 32; Licht, et al., supra note 32; and Song, supra note 32. 
90 See Stulz & Williamson, at 316.  (The study confirmed that legal origins matter for the development of 
the stock markets, in contrast to significance of culture for debt markets). 
91 See generally Roe, supra note 32; Licht, et al., supra note 32; and Song, supra note 32. 
92 John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2175-77.   
93 A possible argument could be based upon unfamiliarity of the modern reforms that are likely to attract 
resentment, particularly in countries with colonial legal history.  For instance, if one argues against 
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transition economies.94  The studies have discussed countries’ adopting “their legal 
systems involuntarily (through conquest or colonization)”95 but such studies did not 
examine the efficacy of such rules.  These rules may well be on the books even enforced, 
yet it is debatable whether such rules enjoy popularity at the grass-roots level.  The 
people in such societies may still look for a customary or religious source of law. 
 
Evaluating drawbacks of the cultural norms, a relationship-based system of governance 
may be more practical for the transition economies, but it will inevitably result in the 
misallocation of capital that discourages the entrepreneurs.96  As another drawback of a 
relationship-based system, it will exclude foreigners from the operating circle of the 
market.  
 
A recent study has left many questions unanswered about the equity markets of the 
developing countries.97  Adding to that list of questions, it remains to be examined 
whether there is a lack of compliance with the modern transplanted rule; and, instead of 
law, there is adherence to the customary business practices and norms.98  Customary laws 
that often shape the corporate behavior and ownership structures appear more significant 
for the economies in transition.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
adherence to the rule of law in Pakistan, one reason for such social tendency could be explained that the 
law itself is being perceived as a colonial legacy, and hence, perceived to deserve lesser regard.  The 
resentment toward a foreign set of rules breeds disregard or violation and, therefore, corruption may 
follows in most cases. 
94 Stulz & Williamson, supra note 32, at 346.  (The authors specifically note this possibility for the 
countries with the history of being colonized). 
95 La Porta et al., supra note 19, at 1126. 
96 Coffee, supra note 4, at 706. 
97 Shleifer et al., supra note 32, at 774.  
98 See Jeffrey D. Sach & Ghiath Shabsigh, Economic Development and the Muslim World, available at 
http://ifptest.law.harvard.edu/ifphtml/pdfs/Seminar_FT.pdf. (Explaining reasons for unprecedented growth 
of Islamic banking, insurance, personal finance and Shariah debt instruments in the emerging Muslim 
markets).  See also infra note 109 (for detailed measures taken by the Security and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan.  Further to the recent stock market crash in March 2005 (known as the March correction), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan concluded the customary carry-over transactions 
(“COT”) were the root cause.  The Commission declared the COT transactions as void with effect from 
December 31, 2005 and issued a continuous finance system as an interim measure.  However, apparently 
due to the market pressure, the Chairman of the Commission was replaced in January 2006.  This was a 
strong indication that customary practices are likely to persist.  As suggested by Prof. John Coffee, this 
could be an evidence of the clash of power groups, see Coffee, supra note 11, at 830.)  
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Customary law 
 
Informal constraints, social norms and formal laws could be categorized as “institutions” 
within the meaning ascribed thereto by the neo-institutional economics.99  Customary law 
fits well in the category.  Customary law may be understood as part of the conscience of a 
community100 and exists even in the modern communities parallel to the statutory law.101  
More specifically, “custom become law when it is known to be law, is accepted as law 
and practiced as law.”102   
 
As for Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and the Muslim Middle-Eastern countries, Islamic and 
other local laws became the customary law once transplantation of the colonial legislation 
commenced; the local laws were enforced by the writ of state before colonization.  For 
instance, the British revived Islamic and Hindu laws by legislation in the united India to 
the extent of partnership, family and inheritance issues, and termed them as “personal 
laws.”  However, the judges in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, interchangeably use the 
expression “customary law” and “personal laws.”   
 
Forming customary laws for economic and business transactions, cultural practices and 
social norms play an influential role in Pakistan’s economy and on Pakistan’s doing-
business scenario.  The diversity arises out of two customary sources: the customary 
norms of doing business in the Indian sub-continent, and Islamic law.  The major local 
firms are organized in the form of a family ownership resembling the “Hindu Joint 
Family System”103  and, on the other hand, the Islamic principles of doing business 
require a peculiar form and substance of transactions.   
 
                                                 
99 Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights In Transition Economies, 1 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 59, 61 (2000). 
100 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, 11 (1983). 
101 ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN PRIVATE LAW, 91 (2001). 
102 Id. at 93. 
103 This system exists particularly, in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan in the customary form of family 
ownership in which the head of the family is the head of the firm. 
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As for the Hindu Joint Family System, the owners prefer to manage the firm themselves 
and do not welcome non-family managers.  Firms resembling such structure rarely 
disperse ownership, and while doing so prefer to retain as much percentage as is 
necessary to keep the minority shareholders out of the boardroom and below the statutory 
threshold for maintaining minority action.  It appears that such firms go public only to get 
listing-related benefits, including ability to have better rating for issuing debt securities in 
the local and international market.  The firms structured on this pattern do not separate 
ownership and control.  In a Hindu Joint Family System, the elder of the household is the 
karta
104 of the family business.  It may be pertinent to mention that in all the colonial 
legislation in the united India, the British expressly kept distinguishing the Hindu Joint 
Family System with the partnership and corporation so that such laws do not regulate it.  
In the Hindu Joint Family System, after the father (who is ex officio karta) the title 
devolves to the eldest of the male offspring, and so on.  Although the businesses are now 
incorporated, but most of the leading firms in Pakistan and India internally represent 
Hindu Joint Family System.      
 
As for adherence to the principles of Islamic finance, the market for the products based 
on Islamic finance is exceeding US$ 400 billion.  Ten years ago the numbers were 
negligible.  Transactions and financial products providing alternate to interest-based 
pricing have experienced unprecedented growth and the present growth rate of 15% is 
considered highest in the international financial markets.105  The demand of securities 
based on the principles of Islamic Finance is constantly increasing.  For instance, after 
Pakistan amended its corporate law and allowed the listed companies to issue redeemable 
capital that is not based on interest, the market was flooded by the successful issuance of 
such debt securities, and the trend continues.106 
                                                 
104 This expression literally means the “doer” and conveys a combined meaning as may be understood of 
“the chairman and the chief executive.”  
105 This fact is evidence by establishing Islamic finance departments or spun-offs by the leading 
international financial institutions, such as Citigroup, ABN AMRO, HSBC etc.  So much so that the 
regulation of Islamic finance is seriously formalized by US regulators.  See Jay Collins, The Road Ahead 
for Islamic Finance, in  INTEGRATING ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE MAINSTREAM: REGULATION, 
STANDARDIZATION AND TRANSPARENCY (Har. Law. Sch. Islamic Finance Project ed.) (forthcoming Fall 
2006) (manuscript on file with author). 
106 The debt securities in Pakistan are known as “Term Finance Certificates” and are issued in terms of 
Section 120 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. 
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To date, not only that such customary laws are deeply entrenched and strongly adhered to 
in the transition economies but also that their statutory and judicial recognition continues 
in the prevalent legal system. 
 
In respect of the securities regulation in Pakistan, customary transactions exist at the 
stock exchanges.  To provide an example, badla transaction is considered customary at 
almost all the stock exchanges in Pakistan and India.  A badla transaction is a carry-
forward transaction with easy access to finance at the fluctuating market, and with easy 
settlement procedure.107  Efforts to replace the badla transaction were strongly resented 
in Pakistan and reportedly resulted replacement of the Chairman of Pakistan SEC in 
January 2006 for apparently entangling with lobby of brokers108 and insisting on new 
Continuous Financing System Regulation to eliminate the carry-over transaction.109  This 
establishes that the customary preferences could be deeply entrenched in emerging 
securities markets, and also that the strong interest groups exist to lobby against the 
reforms.  The issue of interest groups is further discussed below.110  
 
The scholars on corporate governance and transition economies, however, have not 
discussed the role of customary law in defining corporate governance regime for the 
emerging economies.  Specifically, the analysis is missing as to whether corporate 
governance reforms are likely to conflict with existing customary law in the transition 
economies; and, if so, whether the customary laws are likely to persist.  The scholarship 
does not shed light on whether the customary law plays a significant role in shaping 
corporate behavior and ownership structure in transition economies such as India, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Middle-Eastern countries. Future studies examining 
                                                 
107 See generally The State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report (Capital Market), available at 
http://www.sbp.gov.pk/reports/annual/arFY01/chap7.pdf (outlining the badla transaction in Pakistan stock 
markets);  See also India Info Online, the Badla System, available at 
http://www.indiainfoline.com/bisc/badl.html (providing definition of the badla transactions). 
108 See Business and Finance Review, Did Tariq Hassan Deserve it?, available at 
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jan2006-weekly/busrev-16-01-2006/p5.htm (reporting the Chairman’s 
removal and its possible reasons). 
109 See The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Chairman’s Message, available at 
http://www.secp.gov.pk/ChairmanMessage.htm (outlining the measures taken by the Pakistan SEC). 
110 See also infra Part III (C) below. 
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customary law in the context of capital market growth will inform the scholarly debate 
highlighting the ignored aspects of the transition economies. 
 
To coexist with the customary law, the modern reforms should take into account the 
customary law in such a way that the regulatory structure is built with due recognition of 
it.  The process of removing any inconsistencies, if found, between the substantive rights 
and the customary laws, should be staggered and achieved gradually.   Further discussion 
in this regard is also set out below.111  
 
                                                 
111 See also infra Part II below. 
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II. CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMERGING CAPITAL AND 
SECURITIES MARKETS
112
 
 
For transition economies, there is a desire to catch up with the western standards, leading 
the wholesale transfer of commercial laws to the transition economies.113  Convergence 
of this nature limits corporate evolution.114  Reforming corporate governance is a matter 
of comparative institutional analysis.115  Indiscriminate mixing of legal rules may result 
in a dysfunctional or unbalanced system lacking certainty.  The results are likely to be 
worse if an ineffective rule is borrowed from any internationally recognized standards.116  
The scholars have expressed serious doubt for the success of transplanted reforms 
without developing “complimentary institutions”117 or “institutions.”118  However, some 
scholars recommended selective incorporation of foreign regulation into one country’s 
law for the possibility of offering an economical and efficient means of transforming the 
legal structure to attract foreign investment.119 
 
Although formal convergence is likely to face several obstacles, functional convergence 
is achievable through international securities markets, as seen when a foreign firm 
migrate to the U.S. equity markets.120  As a general rule, however, the mere 
transplantation of laws to transition economies may not accomplish the goals of 
developing strong capital and securities markets if the government continues to maintain 
a major role in the economic decision-making of the private sector.121 
                                                 
112 See also infra Part III below.  
113 Pistor et al., supra note 28, at 327. 
114 Coffee, supra note 4, at 646. 
115 Paredes, supra note 1, at 1155. 
116 Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983, 984 (2005). 
117 Gilson, supra note 3. 
118 Paredes, supra note 1. 
119 Jackson, The Selective Incorporation of Foreign Legal Systems to Promote Nepal as an International 
Financial Service Sector, (Working Paper No. 146600) available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=146600. 
120 Coffee, supra note 4, at 650. 
121 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise Of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles Of Law And The State In The 
Separation Of Ownership And Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1, 81 (2001). 
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A. Convergence and Legal Origins 
 
A dominant family-based concentrated ownership structure in the transition economies is 
not likely to help development of deep equity markets, for it promotes lack of 
participation in the capital and securities markets.  To achieve otherwise, an eventual 
recourse to the separation of ownership and control appears inevitable for the emerging 
economies.  However, the customary structure, as discussed above, may resist separation 
of ownership and control.  For ensuring smooth transition, a gradual approach will be the 
best way forward.  Because, a customary norm that has attained social level of acceptance 
equal to the existing norm may replace the existing norm.122  So, gradual, but firmly 
enforced, measures will avoid strong repercussion in the form of market retaliation 
against an unfamiliar norm.   
 
Until the Berle & Means model—of separation of ownership and control—is achieved, 
the transition economies in Pakistan and India may benefit from the countries having 
similar family structures to make the functioning of the capital and securities markets 
more transparent and efficiently regulated.  Simultaneously, other steps such as ensuring 
effective availability of substantive rights, improving regulatory measures, facilitating 
intermediaries and complementaries, gradual increase in minority rights and remedies 
may be gradually taken.  Upon achieving the satisfactory level, incentives123 for 
dispersing ownership and separation of ownership and control would help smooth 
transition.    Any compulsory policy for dispersing ownership and separating ownership 
and control will give rise to constitutional litigation, for instance in Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and India, and will quite likely be successful in view of the available constitutional 
guarantees and traditions.    
 
Like the U.S., many transition economies share common law background, with various 
features of civil law traditions.  Despite this, many economies do not have the Anglo-
American dispersed ownership structure, but rather a concentrated corporate ownership 
structure, like those in developed civil law countries.  While the securities market in such 
                                                 
122 WATSON, supra note 101, at 93. 
123 The incentives may include tax relief and relaxed debt-equity ratio for obtaining debt-financing. 
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economies might develop like the Anglo-American model in the long run, as long as the 
current ownership structure persists, an analytical recourse to the current corporate 
governance regimes in France, Germany and Japan appears advisable—on account of the 
resembling structures of concentrated ownership.  As such, scholars have suggested that 
the transition economies would be better served if they benefit from the corporate 
governance systems of Germany and Japan.124  To the contrary, the transition economies 
borrow heavily from the countries of common law origin.125   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that countries with common law origin were rated higher than 
countries of civil law origin in providing safeguards against related party transactions and 
for “predict[ing] stock market development,”126 a comparative recourse to the civil law 
countries appears beneficial for the transition economies.  One of the reasons is for such 
recourse is to be able to identify the real problem and look for any similarities in other 
countries.  For instance, issues of corporate governance related to the concentration of 
ownership may be resolved with an analytical lesson from the other jurisdictions having 
resembling ownership structures.  Choosing jurisdictions for finding a short-cut legal 
solution may amount to taking wrong medication for a different symptom.  As noted 
recently, shareholder and creditor rights in the emerging markets do not develop as a 
result of a country’s historical association with a particular legal origin.127  At times, the 
experts advising such reforms incorporate provisions from the law of a particular origin 
or a country.128  
 
                                                 
124 Shleifer et al., supra note 32, at 738. 
125 See, e.g.,  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, MANUAL OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, 1 (2002).  The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan acknowledged that its 
Code of Corporate Governance “draws upon the experiences of…countries with a common law tradition” 
and expressly referred to reports and recommendations from the U.K. and South Africa.   
126 Djankov et al., supra note 12, at 35-36; Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note 19;  See also Shleifer et al., 
supra note 32, at 771. (Arguing that the corporate governance systems of the United States, Japan, and 
Germany are equally good because they not only survived but also the economies of these countries 
prospered). 
127 Pistor, supra note 99, at 85. 
128 Id. at 93.  (In Pakistan, for instance, the advisers to the Government of Pakistan are more likely to carve 
out a proposed legislation from the array of similar legislation from various countries that are available 
online).  
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However, sharp distinctions between the common law and civil law no longer exist.  The 
countries, once having a specific legal origin, now share the traditions from their 
counterpart.  In this way, the distinctions that once existed in history have largely 
diminished over the time.  Put simply, the transition economies may either be part of 
commonwealth, and not common law countries, as apposed to belonging to a group of 
imperialist countries, which once were known as civil law countries.  A blanket 
denomination of civil law and common law countries does not accurately convey the 
meanings for the present, but would make sense if used for the ease of reference to 
identify the historical perspective.  Therefore, substantive rights for protecting minorities 
and investors in general do not necessarily emanate from the legal origins, and both the 
concepts exist independent of each other. 
 
A study finds the legal rules and their enforcement for investor protection to be higher in 
the common-law traditions.129  Another study has found a correlation between stock 
market development and the countries’ legal origin.130  As discussed above, regarding the 
diminishing distinctions of common law versus civil law, it is unlikely that such 
distinctions could provide any assistance to improving our understanding of the transition 
economies.  The laws in the transition economies are less influenced by the legal origins 
but are framed more on the basis of local needs and international relations.131  A recent 
work has confirmed the nexus of international relation with the legal development in 
corporate governance.132 Convenient access to the modern legislation internationally 
appears to be the current driving force in the transition economies.  Before advancement 
                                                 
129 La Porta et al., supra note 19, at 1151. 
130 Stulz & Williamson, supra note 32, at 316. 
131 For instance, the laws in Pakistan draw on Pakistan’s commitment to the World Trade Organization and 
other international commitments, including treaties.  Foreign investors and international development 
organizations and lenders also advise on framing legislation, and often pressurize the transition economies 
to pass legislation on their suggested format.  
132 Jeffrey N. Gordon, An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence of Corporate 
Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Union, 1990-2000, (Har. Law Sch. 
Program on Corp. Governance, Discussion Paper No. 406 of 2003) available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/No406.03.Gordon.pdf). 
See also The International Relations Wedge in the Corporate Governance Debate, CONVERGENCE AND 
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 161-209 (Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe eds., Cambridge 
University Press (2005). 
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of informational technology, such access was limited to conventional sources, and the 
choices were limited to the familiar legislation from the imperialist origin. 
 
Besides irrelevance of legal origins to the transition economies, converging to the U.S. 
model of corporate governance would mean adopting the shareholders’ model of 
maximizing the shareholders’ wealth.133  However, in a concentrated corporate ownership 
structure, like in most of the transition economies, maximizing shareholders’ interest 
would result in enrichment of fewer people and would adversely affect the market 
development.134 The shareholder’s model, therefore, may not be workable for achieving 
“thick and deep equity markets” in the emerging markets.  As noted below in the 
concluding remarks, political drive to alleviate poverty coupled with the peer-pressure for 
corporate philanthropy, initiatives for social welfare are expected of the successful firms 
in countries like Pakistan.   In addition, many laws require firms to contribute to the 
employees’ provident, benevolent and workers’ welfare funds in addition to subjecting 
the corporate earnings to zakat.135  Therefore, to coin a new expression, “socially 
responsible shareholders’ model” appears more likely to be the dominant corporate 
model for many years to come.  Furthermore, in the future, it would be quite logical to 
expect a mandatory corporate social responsibility regime to be a part of corporate 
governance regime in the transition economies.   
 
The likely role of a corporation in social development in the transition economy does not 
coincide with the Anglo-American model.  Therefore, a strict convergence in the 
emerging economies is not likely to be possible, despite strong international pressures. 
                                                 
133 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439 (2001). 
134 Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2063, 2064-67, 2080 (arguing that in concentrated form of corporate ownership the shareholders 
primacy could diminish GNP by resulting into weak competition and monopolistic tendencies)  
135 Zakat: An Islamic religious obligation to annually pay 2.5% of the income for charitable purposes.  This 
was made applicable to corporation in Pakistan in 1980.  
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B. Convergence and “Law Matters” 
 
The pressure for reforming the laws in the emerging markets mainly stems from an axiom 
that “defects in law will increase the cost of capital and reduce its availability.”136  Also, 
since “markets are as deep as their legal foundations,”137 the emerging economies strive 
to improve the quality of their laws, particularly the corporate and securities laws.  For 
emerging markets, dithering to choose the mandatory or enabling corporate law, the 
scholars suggested mandatory corporate law to be more appropriate for the countries in 
transition, and that U.S.-style shareholder primacy to be inappropriate for such 
countries.138 
 
Although disagreeing with the universal applicability of the “law matters thesis,” its 
significance has been considered relevant for the transition economies.139  However, 
some scholars have convincingly argued that law alone is not relevant for developing 
strong and deep securities markets in the transition economies and without the help of 
surrounding private institution the task might not be possible.140  Other arguments regard 
“society’s social and political organization” to be crucial, in addition to the suggested 
institutions, for creation of public firms and a deep securities market141 and to have more 
room for private action.142  
 
As for the “law matters thesis,” its essence “is about strong shareholder property rights, 
as reflected in the control that shareholders are allocated over the enterprise and the legal 
limits that constrain managerial and directorial discretion, all pointing in the direction of 
ensuring that shareholders do not have their wealth expropriated.”143  The “law matters 
                                                 
136 Bernard S. Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1911, 1914 (1996). 
137 Bratton & McCahery, supra note 33, at 296. 
138 Paredes, supra note 1, at 1156. 
139 Mark. J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 269 (2002). 
140 See Paredes, supra note 1. 
141 Mark. J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 539, 601. 
142 See Coffee, supra note 11, at 1829. 
143 Troy A. Paredes, The Importance of Corporate Law:  Some Thoughts on Developing Equity Markets in 
Developing Economies, TRANSNAT’L LAW. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript is on file with author). 
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thesis,” therefore, suggests that minority shareholders will emerge pursuant to laws 
safeguarding their property rights.  However, the potential shareholders may need more 
than protective laws.  A legal framework encouraging entrepreneurs to raise capital from 
the securities market is more important.  That is, a well-conceived combination of foreign 
investment strategy and modernization of customary law will better serve minority 
shareholders. 
 
Accordingly, indigenously developed legal framework that takes into consideration main 
concerns of investor protections, effective accountability, and transparency and ensuring 
effective enforcement will survive the criticism against convergence.  The scholars do not 
approve of transplanting laws alone; they seem to suggest transplanting institutions too.  
This form of convergence is workable only if the emerging capital and securities markets 
start moving toward “functional” or “stealth” convergence.  Functional adaptation will 
provide a hint that the markets are ready for the formal transplant of laws and institutions 
to the extent of functional convergence.  At this juncture, the formal rules to provide 
back-up for the functional convergence should keep in view the social and cultural 
considerations, as discussed above.   
 
Put differently, despite supply of foreign legal rules, the legal reforms in transition 
economies tend to respond to the legal change rather than leading it,144 or a gradual 
policy approach.145  Countries implementing economic reforms gradually coupled with 
“legal and other institutional reforms have developed more effective institutions than 
those that pursued a radical reform agenda.”146  Therefore, improving the law gradually 
and keeping in view the market development and response will be more beneficial to the 
emerging economies.    
                                                 
144 Pistor, supra note 99, at 60. 
145 Id. at 90. 
146 Id. at 93. 
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C. Transplanting Self-Enforcement 
 
The salient features of the self-enforcing model devised for the transition economies 
include: enforcement through actions by shareholders, directors and managers; greater 
protection for outside shareholders; reliance on procedural protections; the use of bright 
line rules that can be enforced for their violation, in contrast to the standards that are 
generally not enforceable; and strong legal remedies.147  Some scholars have endorsed 
“self-enforcing” remedies in the wake of inadequate judicial performance in the transition 
economies.148  Self-regulation may receive good result in transition economies, even in 
the absence of optimal legislation.149 
 
However, the self-enforcing model may not be relevant for those transition economies 
that not only have deficient enforcement mechanisms—despite effective regulatory rules 
on the book—but also less literate common shareholders.  In this scenario, more 
emphasis on effective enforcement through an efficient regulator that safeguards the 
shareholders appears more workable. 
 
In sum, successful adaptation of legal reform to local condition may depend on the socio-
economic conditions of the transition economies, but the success of even apparently 
familiar legal reforms cannot be predicted with confidence.150  However, early success of 
such reforms appears one of the important considerations to avoid lack of public 
support.151 
 
Additionally, there are precursors to corporate governance reforms in the emerging 
markets.  First, based on the relevant international standards, revision of the existing laws 
                                                 
147 Black & Kraakman, supra note 136, at 1916.  See also Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and 
Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002) (discussing legal rules and legal 
systems). 
148 John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market 
Failure, 25 J. Corp. L. 1, 38 (1999). 
149 Coffee, supra note 121, at 81. 
150 Pistor et al., supra note 28, at 356. 
151 Paredes, supra note 1. 
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that relate to the corporate governance152 can be made.  Second, “complimentary 
institutions” or “institutions” that have been regarded as essential for the successful 
securities markets may be developed.  Third, based on a well-researched recognition of 
the customary laws, the above two precursors may be made consistent with such laws. 
                                                 
152 Laws relating to corporate governance may be classified as primary and secondary.  In the paper, laws 
directly relating to the organization, conduct and procedures and the securities regulation could be termed 
as the primary corporate governance laws and those requiring corporate responsibilities for other subject 
matters could be called secondary. See generally Ali Adnan Ibrahim, Corporate Governance in Pakistan—
Analysis of Current Challenges and Synopses for Future Reforms, 6 WASH. U GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Fall 2006),  available at 
http://ravi.lums.edu.pk/cmer/Conference2005/images/Ali%20Adnan%20Ibrahim%20paper.pdf, (discussing 
the laws indirectly related to corporate governance). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS AND REGULATION OF EMERGING 
SECURITIES MARKETS 
 
 
A. Financial Regulation: Objectives and Emerging Securities Markets 
 
Objectives for financial services regulation include protection of public investor, 
elimination of externalities from the failure of intermediaries, redistributive policies, 
equitable norms and consideration of political economy,153 and “elimination of financial 
crime and international terrorism.”154 There are three fields of financial regulation: 
corporate governance, securities regulation, and regulation of financial institutions.155 
 
As for the emerging securities markets, a combination of market institutions and 
regulations ensure effective corporate governance.156  Well-regulated stock exchanges 
will make raising finances convenient.  This can lead to economic growth, without 
having to deal with the drawbacks associated with the foreign aid and borrowing.157  In 
addition to the legislative and regulatory measure, the stock exchanges, as frontline 
regulators, may improve corporate governance practices by protecting investors and 
maintaining the integrity of securities market.158 
 
                                                 
153 Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in Multisectored Financial Services Industry, 77 Wash. U.L.Q. 319, 332-
339 (1999). 
154 This has been added to the list recently.  See Jackson, supra note 7, at 6-7. 
155 Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 
Theoretical Inquiries L. 649, 649 (2001). 
156 Bernard S. Black et al., Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice of 
the Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 546, 546 (2001). 
157 William C. Philbrick, The Paving of Wall Street in Eastern Europe: Establishing Infrastructure for 
Stock Markets in the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies, 25 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 565 (1994). 
158 Robert Todd Lang et al., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards, and Corporate 
Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1558 (2002).  (The author suggests that the stock exchanges should do 
this with the help of the stakeholders). 
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Issuers Choice 
 
In the post-globalization scenario, with lowered barriers to capital and instantaneous 
information flow, securities markets compete and issuers chose the market on which to 
list their securities,159 and would be subject to one set of liability standards and 
enforcement remedies.160  Taking advantage of this trend, issuers, particularly from 
transition economies, may raise equity capital from the market of their choice.161  
However, the issuers form the developed markets may not find it advantageous to chose 
the emerging securities markets.  Availability of “viable”162 and internationally 
competitive and securities markets in the transition economies is likely to change the 
trend. 
 
Issuers opt for international listing for financial reason of raising capital at a lower cost 
and higher valuation for their business on account of foreign identity.163  However, due to 
lower exchange rates, it appears difficult for companies in the transition economies to pay 
dividends in a currency of a higher value.  For instance, the dollar amount is always 
going to be higher in most of the transition economies when it comes to payment of 
dividend to the shareholders in the international markets.  With the expectancy of profit 
always likely to be lower, the issuers from most of the emerging securities markets may 
not have the advantage of raising financial capital at the developed markets. 
In the absence of sufficient legal and regulatory infrastructure164 the transition economies 
cannot offer sophisticated and internationally competitive securities law.  With the lack 
of competitiveness of the emerging securities markets, the foreign investor from the 
                                                 
159 Coffee, supra note 11, at 1759-60. 
160 Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 SMU LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 71, 71 (2000).  (Against the sufficient investor demand, recommending Optimal Standardized 
Issuance to reduce the cost of issuance and promote healthy competition in the primary market). 
161 Coffee, supra note 11, at 1759-60. 
162 Coffee, supra note 148, at 38. (Arguing, inter alia, that viable markets will not develop in the absence of 
a workable regulatory mechanism). 
163 Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International Securities 
Transactions, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 54 (2000). 
164 Including the use of technology for more optimal arrangements at the level of primary market.  See 
generally Scott, supra note 160, at 104. 
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developed economies might stay home,165 instead of choosing to list on emerging 
securities markets.  On the other hand, the lack of international competitiveness may 
prompt the issuers from the emerging securities markets to opt out of their jurisdictions in 
favor of any developed market, making it more difficult for the emerging securities 
markets to develop the lacking competitiveness.  
 
In short, it appears imperative for the economies of transition that their legal framework, 
in particular the corporate laws, serve the objectives similar to its counterpart in 
developed economies.  Essentially, it is necessary to set out governance rules that not 
only recognize and implement the customary law, but also maximize the value of 
investment166 and provide minority protection.167  Or, put differently, blending the 
customary law and the substantive rights for minority and investor protection into the 
corporate governance regime would be beneficial for the emerging markets.  Unlike the 
laws that are not effectively enforced for the reasons of inconsistencies with the 
customary law, a regime combining the substantive rights and the customary law would 
be easily enforceable because ensuring compliance with such regime would be easier.  In 
this way, a better form of corporate governance would become economical and cost-
efficient not only for the transition economies but also for the firms subject to such 
regime.  
 
Regulatory Competition 
 
Internationalized securities markets have made it easier to trade securities around the 
world168 and listing in multiple legal regimes.169  With the disclosed information 
becoming available in multiple jurisdictions, each disclosure has a different impact in 
                                                 
165 Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in 
International Securities Regulation, 39 Ga. L. Rev. 525, 532 (2005). (Arguing that such lack results in 
indeterminacy of the legal system). 
166 Black & Kraakman, supra note 136, at 1913. (Suggesting that the corporate laws for the emerging 
markets must be drafted afresh to work within the available infrastructure).  
167 Coffee, supra note 148, at 39. 
168 Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in a World of 
Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 564 (1998). 
169 Id. at 566-7. 
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different jurisdictions, introducing the possibility for the listed entity to migrate to the 
lower regulatory jurisdiction,170 or a race to the bottom.  However, regarding foreign 
corporations abiding by the U.S. laws when they gain access to the U.S. capital markets, 
the evidence suggests that the corporations opted for the higher-standard regime, or a race 
to the top.171  Thus, the migrating entities exert a downward pressure on jurisdictions 
concerned.172  As found by scholars, the entities may not necessarily migrate, but rather 
play one jurisdiction against the other in an effort to have the most suitable conditions, 
known as regulatory arbitrage.  Regulatory arbitrage, however, is not always successful, 
and the jurisdictions concerned may enhance the regulatory regime.173  Also, many of the 
securities markets in transition have not experienced these dynamics of internationalized 
markets. 
 
For regulatory competition to occur, there must be some degree of choice available to an 
entity to govern its activities.  Additionally, the entity must also be able to move between 
the eligible jurisdictional regimes without incurring excessive costs.  The relevant 
governments should also have the inclination of changing the rules in response to the 
choices of selection that the entity makes.174  The issuer choice does not generally lead to 
a race to the bottom.  On the contrary, it worked in the opposite direction, toward higher 
disclosure standards.175  Evolving linkages across the securities markets, like in E.U. 
member countries, may reduce any need for issuer choice.176  This discussion may, 
however, have a different conclusion with regard to the emerging securities markets.177 
 
                                                 
170 Id. at 567. 
171 Howell E. Jackson, Regulatory Competition in the International Securities Market: Evidence from 
Europe in 1999, 56 Bus. Law. 653, 655 (2001). 
172 Licht, supra note 168, at 567.  See also Coffee, supra note 4, at 705.  
173 See Licht. (Arguing that due to the economic interdependence in the multiple listings, the states may 
have to formalize their internal cooperation, probably through an institution, at 637). 
174 Jackson, supra note 171, at 658-9. 
175 Id. at 691. 
176 Id. 
177 As a notable scholar suggested, the Nepalese model may be an isolated case where, for instance, the 
Swiss firms will have a choice of familiar or higher regime.  That is to say, to have Swiss law as the 
governing law.  See Jackson, supra note 119. 
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The increasing level of competition in international securities markets is now forcing the 
stock exchanges to transform.178 Toward this end, demutualization and international 
mergers and alliances are the popular trends.179  The pressurized exchanges are applying 
various survival techniques including “dual listing,”180  and are exerting further pressure 
for structural reforms in the national securities regimes.181  As being forced by the 
competition,   fragmentation is a current phenomenon in the foreign and U.S. markets, 
along with the stock exchanges demutualization.182 
 
Regulatory Intensity and Public Benefit 
 
In general, regulatory intensity responds to the prevailing markets practices.  It is difficult 
to measure the most desirable regulatory intensity in a particular country due to the 
variety of cross-country variables.  Clearly, different levels of regulatory intensity exist in 
different jurisdictions.183  Increased regulatory intensity is generally beneficial to society, 
but carries a risk of its being counterproductive in some cases.184  Overregulation is also 
likely to make raising capital costly.185  It is generally difficult, and complex, to measure 
the public benefits of financial regulation.186  As for the transition economies, a bare-
minimum of regulatory intensity may direct and allow development in a safe and 
effective manner.  A basic standardization in this regard is likely to be helpful.  Such 
                                                 
178 Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchanges Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the Privatization of Securities 
Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 583, 584 (2001). 
179 Id. at 587. 
180 Amir N. Licht, David’s Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities Regulation in a Small Open Market, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 673, 706 (2001). 
181 Licht, supra note 178, at 626-27. 
182 Robert Todd Lang et al., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards, and Corporate 
Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1492-93 (2002). 
183 Jackson, supra note 7, at 2-3. 
184 Id. at 3.  
185 Black et al., supra note 156, at 546.  In post Sarbanes-Oxley period, various companies have unlisted 
themselves and lesser companies are going public due the increased costs of disclosures and auditing.  An 
estimate of increase in costs is 4%.  This could be an example of over-regulation and increased costs. 
186 Jackson, supra note 7, at 3-4 and 31.  (Suggesting, for measuring the public benefits of financial 
regulation, for instance, examination of the banking and securities regulation, p. 32). 
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standardization may include the principles and objectives proposed by international 
organizations.187 
 
Regulatory structures are influenced by various considerations that vary across 
jurisdictions.188  The U.S. and the U.K. share various organizational traditions, including 
legal and disclosure-based securities regulation, and financial regulation in general.189  
Despite this, there is a substantial divergence between the regulatory structures of both 
the countries,190 with regulatory intensity in the U.K. to be substantially lower than the 
U.S.191     
 
B. Regulatory Convergence 
 
Unlike corporate laws, securities laws are more likely to functionally converge, or, in 
other words, by way of “stealth convergence.”192  Such convergence is generally 
achieved by modifications (or up-gradation) in the listing regulations by the front-line 
regulators.  Amendments in corporate laws is a time consuming process, and is less 
influenced by the regulatory competition and issuers’ choice.  As for convergence at the 
level of securities regulation, this phenomenon has some similarity in the emerging 
securities markets where the publicly traded firms (including the listed foreign investing 
vehicles) have been required by the stock exchanges to comply with the codes of 
corporate governance, including following both new listing rules as well as the applicable 
securities regulation.193  Because the functional or stealth convergence may be a result of 
                                                 
187 For instance, OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance, IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation. 
188 Howell E. Jackson, An American Perspective on the U.K. Financial Services Authority: Politics, Goals 
& Regulatory Intensity, 3 (Har. Law Sch. Program on Corp. Governance, Discussion Paper No. 522 of 
2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Jackson_522.pdf. 
189 Id. at 2. 
190 Id.  
191 Id. at 43. 
192 Coffee, supra note 4, at 705. 
193 The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan directed the stock exchanges to incorporate the 
Code of Corporate Governance in their listing rules.  See The Coe of Corporate Governance, available at 
http://www.secp.gov.pk/news/code_corporate(revised).htm.  Introducing codes of corporate governance as 
part of the listing rules is an international trend in the stock exchanges.  See generally Licht, supra note 
180, at 707. 
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market efficiency, the emerging securities markets may have to rely more on formal 
convergence in order for them to achieve efficiency.  However, the form of convergence 
that can promise efficiency to the emerging securities markets is an issue that remains 
largely unanswered.  As discussed above, the market response will provide a good 
indication whether and when to introduce any modern reforms.  
 
Although the developing countries may learn from the experiences of more advanced 
countries, they should be careful in importing regulatory structures because of the 
variation in the underlying differences.  Such differences could be of scale, composition 
and sophistication of the financial services industry, regulatory objectives, levels of 
enforcement intensity, and levels of lawlessness of population.194  The discussion of 
regulatory convergence is simplified if it implies that the adopted legal rules would be 
enforced optimally.  Optimal enforcement would explain if there is de facto regulatory 
convergence, in addition to de jure convergence.195  Accordingly, the evidence of 
convergence would be more informative if it also includes the intensity with which a 
transplanted rule is being enforced.196   
 
Despite benefits of international comparisons, there are numerous constraints on the 
regulatory harmonization.197  In general, the corporate governance regime of any country 
affects the form and substance of its securities regulation.198  Although corporate laws are 
more likely to converge through harmonization, the securities laws are not.199  Effective 
securities regulation may make up the existing deficiency in corporate laws.200  However, 
some scholars have predicted convergence at the level of securities regulation.201  The 
“piggybacking” strategy helps the issuer to move to a better corporate governance regime 
                                                 
194 Jackson, supra note 7, at 12-14. 
195 Id. at 30-31. 
196 Id. at 31. 
197 Jackson, supra note 188, at 3. 
198 Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to 
Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 230 (1998).   
199 Id. at 285.  (Treating corporate law to be a part of private law and securities regulation to be a part of 
public laws and arguing that due the public character, the securities regulations are less likely to converge).  
200 Licht, supra note 198, at 230. 
201 See Coffee, supra note 4. 
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by listing its shares on a foreign market.202  Therefore, cross-listing may be a way to 
achieving international convergence toward the most desirable regimes,203 despite the 
fact that cross-listing may not be a quick solution to improving the corporate 
governance—the effective measure in this regard should come from the home country.204  
However, cross-listing could be an effective and interim substitute for convergence 
among different countries. 
 
Cultures and Customs in Regulatory Convergence 
 
“[A] systematic cross-cultural theory for corporate governance is urgently needed.”205  
The national cultures play a significant role in the origin and development of the 
corporate governance systems.206  The “cultural infrastructure calls on people to seek 
guidance for conducting their personal life in social interactions in sources other than the 
law.”207  The foreignness of modern reforms is fundamental and the “cultural value 
emphases may preserve and perpetuate the imprint of ancient intellectual legacies and 
historical initial conditions.”208  All the players in the international securities markets, 
including stock exchanges and issuers, understand the overriding factors of distances and 
cultural proximities and make their moves accordingly.209   The cultures and 
informational distances matter even for the cross-listing of securities.210  Some scholars 
have argued that “[r]eligion is a convenient proxy for culture…[but it] fails to capture the 
richness of cultural differences.”211  “Without considering the countries’ cultural regional 
                                                 
202 Licht, supra note 180, at 679. 
203 Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 
22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 195, 197 (2004). 
204 Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 
163 (2003). 
205 Licht, supra note 5, at 203. 
206 Id. 
207 Licht, supra note 203, at 230-31. 
208 Id. at 232. 
209 Licht, supra note 204, at 163. 
210 Licht, supra note 203, at 239. 
211 Licht, supra note 32, at 231. (This analysis, however, does not take into consideration weather the 
reverse would be true, that is, religion shaping the culture and not vice versa).   
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affiliation, the legal family classification may yield inaccurate depictions of global 
pattern in corporate governance regimes.”212   
 
The available literature does not distinguish between culture and the customary law and 
may include customary law in its generality.  The absence of such distinction may be the 
result of reliance upon scholarly works in the general areas of social sciences.  A 
distinction, however, exists in jurisprudence.213   
 
Convergence vis-à-vis Specialization 
 
It is likely that different markets specialize in trading securities of a particular type of 
firms.214  This phenomenon may be developed in the emerging securities markets where 
firms eyeing for particular incentives invest in specialized sectors.  Accordingly, given 
the nature of incentives in various sectors by the transition economies, the emerging 
securities markets may develop specialized trading expertise in the securities of a 
particular sector or industry.  As discussed below, such specialization may be consistent 
with their foreign investment policy. 
 
Convergence and Regionalization   
 
The prediction of specialized stock exchanges serving different clienteles of listed 
corporations215  may also occur at the regional level in the emerging securities markets.  
The divergence of investment opportunities in the transition economies may lead to 
competition to attract foreign investment.  Depending on the success of the foreign 
investment policies in specific industrial sectors, regional securities markets may develop 
                                                 
212 Id. at 247. 
213 See generally THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 2001). 
214 Coffee, supra note 4, at 652. 
215 Coffee, supra note 11, at 1830. 
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to attract listing in the specialized sectors.216  However, empirical evidence in this regard 
remains to be explored.   
 
The law of one price provides another possibility for the emerging securities markets to 
have integrated arrangements.217  Before achieving regionalization or integration, the 
emerging securities markets may consider harmonization, multi-jurisdictional disclosure 
system and an offshore free-zone to increase their competitiveness.218 
 
Scholars have recommended regional cooperation among the emerging securities 
markets, focusing specifically on Latin America,219 Sub-Saharan Africa220 and Eastern 
Europe.221  Likewise, the Middle-Eastern economies222 are on their way of a regional 
                                                 
216 One form of regionalized securities market is a regional homogeneous market for the securities based on 
the principles of Islamic Finance. The industry of Islamic Finance is growing at the rate of 15% and is 
reaching US$ 400 billion.  A specialized regional stock exchange will provide a platform for further 
growth. See Ali Adnan Ibrahim, Islamic Financial Services Industry:  Corporate Governance and Need for 
a Regional Securities Market, in  INTEGRATING ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE MAINSTREAM: REGULATION, 
STANDARDIZATION AND TRANSPARENCY (Har. Law. Sch. Islamic Finance Project ed.) (forthcoming Fall 
2006) (manuscript on file with author). 
217 Licht, supra note 180, at 687.  (Arguing, inter alia, that the law of one price curbs arbitrage profits—
under-priced buying and overpriced selling).  
218 Scott, supra note 160, at 78 and 92.  (The author does not consider harmonization and multi-
jurisdictional disclosure system viable for international securities market—but recommends establishing 
offshore free-zone). 
219 Les Riordan, Three Proposals for a Latin American Stock Exchange, Private Offshore Market, or a 
Computerized Financial Information Service, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 585 (1996). 
220 Evelyn Bradley, A regional Stock Exchange: Hope for Sub-Saharan Africa Stock Markets, 8 MSU-DCL 
J. Int’l L. 305 (1999); See also Charles R. P. Pouncy, Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Western Legal 
Institutions as a Component of the Neo-Colonial Project, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 85 (2002) (criticizing 
this strategy);  See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA 
Calls the Tune, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 17 (2005) (setting out general economic cooperative 
initiatives in Africa). 
221 Philbrick, supra note 157. 
222 These countries are also committed to reforming their capital markets and continue to look for the right 
guideline for the reforms.  For instance, the Director General of “Dubai International Finance Centre” 
announced the establishment of a “Regional Institute of Corporate Governance to serve at improving the 
regional securities and financial markets.  Dr. Omar Bin Sulaiman maintained:  
 
Transparency and governance is critical in delivering the knowledge, capital, and skills that will 
enable the region to diversify its economies away from oil and gas, and to grow the wealth of its 
people, which will lead to political and social stability. As we raise our corporate governance 
levels, it will increase trust in the region's financial sector, and contribute to attracting foreign 
direct investment, as well as encouraging local and regional banks to provide financing to SMEs 
and entrepreneurs. 
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securities market.  Furthermore, to launch a world-class financial center in the Middle 
East, Dubai223 established the Dubai International Financing Center, a free-trade zone 
with an independent regulatory authority to oversee the activities related to the Center.224   
 
In sum, in addition to international sponsorship, a culturally sensitive regulatory 
framework and regional cooperation will promote the success of securities market in a 
developing country.225 
 
C. Foreign Investment and Emerging Securities Markets 
 
Like other countries in transition, Pakistan remains committed to encouraging foreign 
investment in its industrial and service sectors, and offers incentives such as fiscal relief, 
tax havens, and repatriation of profits, original investment and disinvestment proceeds.  
Eying low costs of production, foreign investors often find such incentives attractive.  In 
return, Pakistan receives employment and trade opportunities.226  The result is that 
foreign investment has substantially increased in Pakistan.  Most of the investment 
vehicles are organized as private companies, and in a local-foreign joint venture scenario, 
as unlisted public companies.  However, the number of listed subsidiaries of an off-shore 
holding entity is small, and such subsidiaries rarely offer any substantial equity. 
 
Although “[c]ountries with worse governance have a smaller fraction of wealth owned by 
foreign investors because insiders have larger ownership shares in such countries,”227  the 
foreign investors organize their corporate vehicles similar to the most dominant, or 
                                                                                                                                                 
For complete coverage of the above announcement, see http://www.ameinfo.com/73238.html (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2005). See also Paul A. Mackey et al., Internal Securities and Capital Markets, 39 INT’L LAW. 373, 
373 (2005); 
223 Dubai is one of the 5 Emirates of the United Arab Emirates, and is regarded the most attractive for 
foreign investment in whole of the Middle-East.  Dubai appears to stands out as successful experiment of 
legal transplant.  This aspect required further analysis in a separate work.   
224 Mackey et al., supra note 222, at 374. 
225 Jason Gottlieb, Launching the Phnom Penh Stock Exchange, Toward a Legal Framework for Launching 
a Stock Exchange in an Underdeveloped Country, 14 COLUM, J. ASIAN L. 235, 275 (2000). 
226 Such opportunities include the provision of raw materials and labor and services contracting. 
227 Stulz, supra note 26, at 1624. 
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culturally consistent, ownership pattern—which is the concentrated one in Pakistan.  
More problematically, the overwhelming majority of foreign investors follow this pattern.   
 
Despite the increased foreign investment, the economic benefits do not seem to trickle 
down, but rather remain largely restricted to a small part of the population who are 
directly involved with the industrial operations of the investment vehicle.  One possible 
reason for the limited role of foreign investment is its limited economic interaction with 
the local market. 
 
Reforms in Securities Markets and Rent Seeking 
 
Pakistan is not only consistently revising its corporate and securities laws to conform to 
the international standards but also providing maximum facilities for the foreign 
investment in all the sectors of its economy.  Despite this, Pakistan has yet to achieve the 
critical mass to turn the securities markets into a significant factor in its economic 
growth.  The existence of “thick and deep equity markets” would require participation by 
the mainstream of the economy in the equity markets.   
 
Generally, it is not possible to measure the influence of internal and/or external forces 
that shape the legal reforms.228  However, foreign investors have been able to negotiate 
legislative and regulatory protections in the emerging markets.  Their influence is also 
likely to influence the corporate governance reforms.  For instance, local investors will 
not be encouraged to become minority shareholders as long as the corporate governance 
regime does not guarantee appropriate protection.  Since the local investors do not have 
the adequate clout to outweigh the existing rent-seeking groups, they are less likely to 
achieve effective protections.  However, in the event that foreign investors are 
encouraged to become minority shareholders in the emerging securities markets, the 
foreign investors would be able to exert the advantage of their position to negotiate better 
protections with the governments in the transition economies.  The protections, once 
accorded to the foreign investors for being the minority shareholders, will also be 
                                                 
228 Pistor, supra note 99, at 93. 
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available to the local investors, and will encourage them to become the minority 
shareholders.  Otherwise, the locals are not likely to secure greater legal protection on 
vis-à-vis the majority owners, who see active minority to be a threat to their “private 
benefits of control.”    
 
The foreign investors have been able to negotiate lucrative financial and fiscal incentives 
in a number of emerging markets.  For instance, in Pakistan, the foreign investors in 
energy, infrastructure and telecommunication sectors receive sector-specific incentives.  
All of them have influenced amendments to the national antitrust law that declares 
control of one-third of the market share of any services (and good) to be monopoly and, 
therefore, prohibited and liable to compulsory disinvestment and dilution.229  Strong local 
industries have not been able to convince the government for carving out any exception.  
Tax haven for up to 5 and more years and fixed (as opposed to pro rata generaly 
applicable) stamp duty and registration fee on the financing documents are other 
incentives enjoyed by such sectoral investors.  Particularly in the power and energy 
sectors, the Independent Power Producers and Oil & Gas Exploring Companies execute 
Concessions Agreements that list the assurances by the Government of Pakistan in 
respect of obtaining various governmental permissions from the federal and provincial 
authorities.  Such concessions also include assurances against “change of law” (including 
any judgment of the court) that may be detrimental to such investors.  Upon such 
happening or loss of concessions, Sovereign Guarantees becomes immediately 
encashable.  In standard government contracts, Pakistan law and courts are 
nonnegotiable.  However, the investment disputes with the Government of Pakistan 
include out of Pakistan settlement mechanisms, including international arbitration, 
foreign governing laws and foreign forum.  In addition, some foreign investors have also 
invoked International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the award of 
which is enforceable by the World Bank through its deduction/increase in the aid/debt 
for/of Pakistan, and for that matter ay other emerging economies.  
 
                                                 
229 Although the law has apparently provided a different adjudicating authority for such sectors, but it is 
common knowledge that such authorities are the ones granting the (licensing) rights to the foreign investors 
that lead to the market share in excess of the prohibited threshold. 
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With the support from the developing countries’ lenders, the foreign investors enjoy a 
great leverage in negotiating legislative and administrative protections from the 
economies in transition.  Therefore, unless the international investors are willing to 
become minority shareholders in the emerging securities markets, the existing family 
ownerships will likely resist the modernization initiatives.230  Initiatives to change the 
status quo are likely to be resisted and lobbied against by the existing interest groups,231 
who would consider themselves better off otherwise.  Ensuing rent-seeking tactics may 
halt the reform initiatives and further delay the expected economic growth.  To avoid this 
stumbling block, persuading the affected constituencies is the most effective way to 
facilitate smooth implementation of reforms in the transition economies.232 
 
A chief concern among foreign investors is the unfamiliarity with the local corporate and 
securities laws,233 or the local corporate governance regime.  For the foreign investor, 
familiarity with local laws and their trust on the effective enforcement of such laws is 
quite important before such investor can implement their investment strategy.  
Appreciating the concerns and recognizing the global trend,234 Pakistan began reforming 
its corporate governance regime.  Such reforms are mostly achieved through importing or 
mixing various models from the developed economies.  However, rather than moving 
toward an internationally competitive securities market, Pakistan is attracting more 
foreign investment in the industrial and service sectors.235 
 
In general, foreign investment contributes to the economic growth in the transition 
economies, by increasing the number of jobs and trade opportunities.  However, mere 
reliance on foreign investment instead of improving conditions for nurturing the local 
                                                 
230 See generally Mark J. Roe, Rents and their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2001). 
231 La Porta et al., supra note 40, at 512. 
232 Marc I. Steinberg, Emerging Capital Markets: Proposals and Recommendations for Implementation, 30 
INT'L LAW. 715, 738 (1996). 
233  Jackson, supra note 119, at 4.  See also Ibrahim, supra note 152. (Specifying relevant laws that impact 
corporate governance in Pakistan). 
234 See generally CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 1-6 (Jeffrey N. Gordon 
and Mark J. Roe eds., Cambridge University Press (2005)) (giving brief overview of global trends). 
235 See generally The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Message of the Chairman, available 
at http://www.secp.gov.pk/ChairmanMessage.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) (outlining a number of 
measures taken by Pakistan SEC). 
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industry could have disastrous consequences not only for the local industry but also for 
the economy in general.  Foreign investment should be encouraged primarily to introduce 
healthy competition, which is beneficial for the local industry.  As for the capital and 
securities markets in the transition economies, well-developed markets become attractive 
without much effort, and, conversely, under-developed markets do not—no matter how 
lucrative incentive are offered.  Institutions such as customary law coupled with the 
substantive legal protections, effective enforcement and development of legal and non-
legal institutions bring internal strength to the markets; and the markets become attractive 
for foreign investment.  Lack of foreign investment in the securities market in Pakistan 
indicates that Pakistan’s market is not perceived to be developed or ready for the 
international investors.  Such perception could only be set aside if the market is profitable 
to a larger number of participants locally, rather than to the existing limited number.  
Such participation is achievable only by allowing customary law to be part and parcel of 
the corporate governance regime.    
   
Future Considerations for Regulating Emerging Securities Markets 
 
As discussed above, a standard pattern of foreign investment in the transition economies 
suggests that the foreign investors are more attracted to industrial and related sectors 
mainly for cost efficiency reasons.  In doing so, the foreign investors retain majority 
control in the investing vehicle and avoid a resisting minority by rarely diluting the 
ownership interests.  More rights and increased protections for the minority, as reiterated 
recently,236 may stand inconsistent with the existing business strategy of cost efficiency.  
Viewing this way, an inverse demand for convergence of the corporate governance 
regime may partly exist in the transition economies.  The convergence to this effect could 
lead to investment flight to less stringent emerging securities markets, unlike a race to the 
top in the developed economies.   
 
Continued lower standards of corporate governance appears to increase the quantum of 
industrial foreign investment while higher standards of corporate governance, ironically, 
                                                 
236 See generally Djankov et al., supra note 8. 
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dissuades the foreign investors from diluting their ownership interest in the emerging 
securities markets.  However, it remains to be examined whether the convergence of 
corporate governance could lead to investment flight to less stringent emerging securities 
markets. 
 
Ineffective International Initiatives 
 
Reforms suggested by various international organizations237 and those sponsored by the 
international lending agencies do not appear to be helping the expansion of the securities 
markets.  The main reason for their lack of efficacy is the unfamiliar origin of the new 
rules.  When a significant number of potential market participants do not understand the 
new rules and their intent in their common parlance, they are less likely to follow them 
for lack of understanding.  Therefore, an examination of local customs and market 
practices is pertinent. 
 
As discussed above, achieving a self-reliant market is possible through implementing 
and, where necessary, modernizing the indigenous customary practices.    Increased local 
participation in the emerging securities markets will be an outcome of the market 
ensuring protection of investment and culturally consistent and familiar corporate 
governance regime.  Once strengthened by the local participation, foreign investment will 
turn to the emerging securities markets to tap the potential profits, and not vice versa: The 
market will not be profitable merely by inviting foreign investment to the securities 
markets.  
  
In the event that the foreign investment in the securities market is found less likely to 
strengthen the securities market, the transition economies will be left with only the option 
                                                 
237 Such institutions include: Asia Pacific Corporate Registers Forum (APCRF); Asian Development Bank 
(ADB); International Finance Corporation (IFC); International Monetary Fund (IMF); International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO); Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD); South Asian Securities Regulators Forum (SASRF); United Nations Development 
Fund (UNDP); and World Bank.  These institutions are officially designated as “stakeholders” by 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, available at 
http://www.secp.gov.pk/InternationalOrganizationAgencies.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). 
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of mobilizing the local entrepreneur to the securities market.  Although this outcome 
would be contrary to the expectations and national policies of various emerging markets, 
but this strategy should be the starting point, rather than the fall back option for failure of 
foreign investment to provide a kick-off start.  Foreign investment will find an emerging 
securities market attractive if the market is already offering profitable participation.  To 
achieve a level of increased participation, the emerging economies need to focus on the 
concerns that an ambivalent entrepreneur or local investor may have.  Such concerns may 
adequately be addressed through, among others, modernizing customary law, as 
discussed above.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Comparing the corporate evolution in the developed economies with the emerging 
markets provides us a better insight to the distinct features of the transition economies.  
Identification of such differences helps devise better strategies for the economies in 
transition to improve their economic growth.   
 
The forces directing the corporate evolution, for instance, in the U.S. were strikingly 
different from those that any of the emerging markets might to be facing today.  That is, 
concentration of economic power followed the rise modern corporation, and with this 
emergence, strong political power of the state looked to regulate the economic strength of 
the corporation, which it tried to avoid.238  Thus, corporate governance, particularly, in 
the U.S. represents a political tussle as suggested by Berle and Means.239   
 
On the other hand, corporation in the emerging markets has not become a significant 
economic power as yet,240 the political forces in the emerging markets tend to deregulate 
corporation and offer lucrative incentives, to attract foreign corporations.  Corporate 
governance in the emerging markets is political strategy to attract foreign corporations, 
for improving economic growth, than to regulate them—which appears the case in the 
developed economies. 
 
Foreseeing the future of capital markets in the emerging economies, it looks to be 
somewhat close to what Berle and Means suggested that the survival of the corporate 
system may rest on spreading its profits on various stakeholders in society, while almost 
rejecting the shareholders’ model.241  Since the capital and securities markets reforms are 
part of the poverty alleviation strategy in the emerging economies, it looks more logical 
                                                 
238 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 357. 
239 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
240 But even if it be true, such power remains mostly with the families that own the majority shares, and not 
with the corporation as such. 
241 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 356. 
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that the laws of emerging markets require a mandatory participation for social welfare.  
This governmental strategy is likely to be more aggressive when the emerging markets 
achieve some level of economic growth as a result of foreign investment.  Making the 
foreign corporations to contribute to the social welfare is quite likely to generate the 
debate, in future, over sharing of profits with the society vis-à-vis the rights to 
repatriation. 
 
The development of capital and securities markets for the transition economies mainly 
rests on the regulatory infrastructure that includes the right law that incorporates the 
social and cultural practices and establishment of the supporting institutions.  Such 
practices include customary laws that often shape corporate behavior and ownership 
structures, and are more significant in the economies in transition.  As most of the 
scholarly discussions consider the empirical evidence from the developed economies, the 
resulting emphasis on the protection of property rights, and investor and minority 
protections, are relevant to the economies of transition.  Sagacious introduction of foreign 
legal rules are of direct relevance to the emerging markets.  Such reforms would yield 
better results when considered along with the cultural and customary dimensions of the 
transition economies. 
 
The scholarship on this subject does not provide any guidance as to whether attracting 
foreign investment and modernizing the corporate governance structure are two 
inherently divergent policies being pursued by the transition economies.  It remains to be 
examined whether foreign investment in the emerging securities markets will be reduced 
in the event of the convergence.  In this regard, an examination of the patterns of foreign 
investment in industrial and related sectors vis-à-vis the foreign investment in securities 
markets may explore, among others: (i) whether  corporate governance reforms, in some 
aspects, are inconsistent with the existing business strategy of cost efficiency for the 
foreign investors; and (ii) whether higher standards of corporate governance will, 
ironically, dissuade the foreign investors from dispersing their ownership structure in the 
emerging securities markets.   
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Foreign investment policies and corporate governance reforms need to be closely 
interrelated if the emerging markets intend to open their securities markets for 
international investors.  Future empirical studies focusing on the emerging markets 
should introduce new areas of inquiry that would help develop strong securities markets, 
which would play their desired role in the economic growth of the developing world.  
Such studies should highlight and analyze the role of customary law in shaping the 
corporate governance regime, foreign investment policies, possibilities of regional 
integration (of both heterogeneous and homogeneous markets) and the extent of 
involvement of corporations in CSR initiatives. 
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